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Beyond Mere War
Authority and Legitimacy in the Formation of the Latin
American States

Robert H. Holden
Old Dominion University

Introduction

When observed against the worldwide panorama of state formation, the
states of Latin America compose a group with two salient features. The
first is a crisis of order and legitimacy. The second is the exceptionally
long duration of that crisis, which began in 1808 with the collapse of the
Spanish monarchy. On close inspection, irregularities in the depth, character and timing of the crisis appear; for example, Chile, Costa Rica and
Uruguay continue to stand apart for their relatively more peaceful,
democratic, stable and law-abiding ways. Still, across Latin America,
the high expectations raised in the 1980s .by the nearly uniform shift
away from military rule and the tumultuous populisms of previous
decades, toward more stable and democratic forms of governance, have
largely been disappointed. Lawless violence, impunity and the rule of
elected but inept and corrupt governments - some of whom have already
summoned back to life the old authoritarian habits - persist almost
everywhere.
No one is more aware of the protracted nature of the crisis of order
and legitimacy, or laments it more, than Latin Americans themselves.
"Our States are sclerotic and hypertrophic, incapable of satisfying the
needs of our peoples and of providing the fruits that democracy is
obligated to deliver," declared Oscar Arias, the retiring president of
Costa Rica at yet another summit meeting of Latin American heads of
state in 2010. Mocking the high-level chatter about democracy and
development that prevails at such meetings, and criticizing the intelligentsia's fondness for sterile theories of the region's "eternal victimization," Arias pointed out that Latin America had advanced little in
recent decades, and in some ways had even fallen behind, particularly
in three crucial dimensions of state formation: the construction of
reliable institutions, respect for the rule of law and bureaucratic effectiveness. His speech was a short, blunt version of the conclusions about
243
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the region's "crisis of governability" that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reached in its massive 2004 study of Latin
American democracy. 1
What accounts for Latin America's general failure .to govern itself
according to the constitutional norms its leaders have habitually proclaimed? No matter how we choose to classify the symptoms of distresswhether as problems of order, legitimacy, institutional effectiveness or
governability - they all point to some fundamental deficiency in the
state formation process, toward the existence of what Guillermo
O'Donnell has called a "severe incompleteness of the state" that seems
to have become even more prominent since the period of democratic
consolidation began in the 1980s. 2 Accordingly, few items on the
research agenda of the historian of Latin American state formation
seem more urgent than the twofold problem of accounting for both
the source of the legitimacy-order crisis, and its remarkable persistence.
In pursuit of that goal, the section that follows will both suggest
a procedural approach to the problem and identify the distinguishing
characteristics of the Latin American state. The next section will offer
reasons for rejecting as inapplicable the so-called bellicist theory
of state growth as an explanation for those characteristics. The
third section will argue for the relevance of two neglected spheres of
state making, authority and legitimacy. Finally, I will proffer an alternative explanation for the Latin American state's longtime failure to
thrive that emphasizes the centrality of beliefs about authority and
legitimacy. 3

Oscar Arias Sanchez, "Que cada palo aguante su vela" (Republica de Costa Rica,
Presidencia de la Republica , 2010). Arias spoke with some authority . Nearing the end
of his second (non-consecutive) term as president, he won the Nobel Peace Prize in
1987 for having piloted Central America out of the region-wide war that engulfed it in the
l 980s, during his first period as president (1986-90) . For the UNDP study, see Programa
de las Naciones Unidas para el Desru.Tollo, La democracia en America Latina: Hacia una
democraciade ciudadanas y ciudadanos (New York: Prograi.na de las N aciones U nidas para
el De sarr ollo, 2004). Similar confessions of failure can be found in Cumbres
lberoamericanos de Jefes de Estado y de Gobiemo, Declaracion de Vina . Del Mar,
November 7-11, 1996, www.segib.org/documentos.php;
and in Organization .· of
American · States, Convencion lnt eramericana Contra la Corrupcion, March 29, 1996,
www.oas.org/JU1idico/spanish/Tratados/b-58.html,
in which the signatories agreed to
"consider" taking steps aimed at adopting "norms of conduct for the correct, honorable
and proper observance of public functions ."
2 Guillemio A. O'Donnell,
"Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America:
A Partial Conclusion," 1n: Juan E. Mendez, Guillermo A. O'Donnell and Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro (eds.), The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America (Notre
Dru.ne, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p. 314.
3 For another appeal to the relevance of legitimacy in state-making, see the chapter on the
•Middle East in this volume by Dietrich Jung.
1
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What Is the Latin American State?
Turning first to the theoretical literature on state formation, we find at
the center of that work the epochal contributions of Charles Tilly, a
specialist in the history and sociology of the early modern and modern
periods of Europe . Writing toward the end of his career, in the mid1990s, Tilly described his research program as a "historically embedded
search for deep causes operating in variable combinations, circumstances, and sequences with consequently variable outcomes" (emphases
added). For good measure, he went on to condemn the "invariant
thinking" that had produced so many useless transhistorical models - a
method, he wrote, "doomed to eternal failure." The historical problems
to which Tilly had dedicated his career to investigating - collective
action, social revolution and state formation - drew him into "big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons," to quote the lighthearted
title of one of his books. What Tilly therefore seemed to be promising
anyone in search of the "deep causes" of state formation - the theme of
this collection - is variability on a vast scale in both process and outcome. 4 Given both the grandeur and ubiquity of variability, the question
is how to · handle it. In two short paragraphs, Tilly recommended a
threefold procedure. Start with "plausible •Ontologies - representations
of what is to be explained in terms of a given process's boundedness,
continuity, plasticity, and complexity." Second, specify the relevant
"fields of variation" or the way that the sources, processes, forms and
outcomes of, say, state formation, relate to a variety of other phenomena.
Finally, a "valid" analysis ought to end up with some "principles of
variation" that apply to different aspects of the problem. As always, Tilly
did not fail to acknowledge the difficulties and uncertainties awaiting
researchers inclined to follow his advice - there was, he warned, "plenty
of work to do. " 5
Following Tilly, I will begin by offering a brief "plausible ontology" of
the states of Latin America. Then, in proceeding to his second step, I will
concentrate on two "fields of variation" - first, war making, and second,
the interrelated problems of authority and legitimacy. In · a nutshell,
I intend to reject the first as scarcely relevant, and hold up the second
as a cardinal component of any explanation of Latin America's governability crisis. The procedural method is Tilly's, but if there is a "general

4

5

Charles Tilly, "To Explain Political Processes," The American Journal of Sociology, vol. l 00,
no . 6 (May 1995), pp. 1594-1610, here atpp. 1595, 1600, 1602; idem, BigStructu111s,Large
Processes,Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984). ·
·
Tilly, "To Explain Political Processes," pp . 1605- 6.
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theory" behind what follows, it would be that of "multiple modernities,"
as elaborated primarily by S. I. Eisenstadt and Charles Taylor . As the
civilization of modernity swept beyond Europe, it created possibilities
distinct from those in Europe. The result, according to Eisenstadt:
"A great variety of modern or modernizing societies" that shared many
features but that also revealed striking differences as a result of those
societies' particular responses to modernity and their continued interaction with it. Modernity's spread beyond Europe entailed, therefore,
not wholesale adoption, ·but "the continuous selection, reinterpretation
and reformulation" of modernity's norms as well as the emergence of
distinctive institutions. 6 A clear case of such "reformulation," I argue, is
the Latin American state. It is true that one can find distinct trajectories
of state making within Latin America, as already noted · in the first
paragraph of this essay, but they took plac·~ along a larger path that clearly
diverged from, say, the western European or 'the North Atlantic path, as
will be seen below. In its insistence on the continuous reinterpretation
and adaptation of modernity's cultural program, Eisenstadt's theory
coincides with Tilly's own suppositions about variation.
Let us begin by improving Tilly's definition of the state, which he
called "a distinct organization that controls the principal concentrated
means of coercion within a well-defined territory, and in some respects
exercises priority over all other · organizations operating within the
same territory." 7 This definition only implies an end or purpose that
ought to be made explicit, which I would do by adding that the state's
end is always to abate disorder by creating a system of laws not subject
to any other power. 8 Tilly refers to this aspect of the state only
obliquely ("and in some respects exercises priority over all other
organizations"), probably because he was operating in the modern
European arena, where it could be taken for granted. As we have
6

7

8

S. N. Eisenstadt, Comparative Civilizar:ionsand Mufaple Modernities, vols. 1 & 2 (Leiden:
Brill, 2003), 2:520-2. Similarly, Charles Taylor noted that modernity can only be
understood in the ·plural, in terms of the diverse "self-understandings" or multiple
"social imaginaries" that have constitmed modernity; Charles Taylor, Modern Social
Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 1-2.
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capii:al and European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1990), pp. 130- 1. ·
My definition is a compound of F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (London: C. A. Watts & Co.,
1966), pp. 16-17, 21; and Alexander Passerin D'Entreves, The Notion of the State: An
Introduction to Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 96. We could step
back still further and consider Oakeshott's distinction between a state understood as a
lordly "managerial apparatus" (universitas) or as a free "association of human beings"
(societas), and his argument that both views have been "contingently joined by the choices
of human beings in the character of a modern European state"; Michael Oakeshon, On
Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 323.
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already seen, however, order is not an end that can be taken for
granted in the Latin American state-building context; _
At the outset, therefore, we would have to concede that the primary
attribute of quite a few Latin American states has been their lack of
achievement as states, for in their quest to abate ·disorder, they .have
manifestly failed. In most of the Central American countries, as well as
generally in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, ·Peru, Venezuela and periodically almost everywhere else, we see continuing signs of the world's oldest
crisis of independence - 202 years, as of this writing, and showing little
sign of easing. ·IfTilly's calling was .to explain the success of certain states
in the North Atlantic world, it has fallen to others to try to explain the
historic feebleness arid inferiority of their Latin American imitators. Over
time, their failure has expressed itself in numerous ways ---'in the more or
less constant agony of reorganization, the fugacious loyalty of a congeries
of fighting forces, the indignity of not possessing the legitimacy required
for an authoritative system of laws to command widespread obedience.
l have tried elsewhere to explain these qualities, with particular attention to the five states of Central America, by holding up what I called
these states' "improvisational character." 9 Their well-known inclination
toward instability, I wanted to point out, was rooted in a commitment to
the habitual reassembly of the state apparatus itself, on a pro tempore basis,
out of the labor of a melange of collaborators, including regional caudillos
(roughly, warlords or political bosses) and their followers, municipallevel authorities and strongmen and, later, the armed forces or factions of
the armed forces. This constant need among state makers to attract and
maintain allies made the state's officeholders much more than a mere
government, for . they were essentially reorganizers of the state itself.
Nowhere was that reorganizational task more evident than in the primordial requirement of every new government to attract and hold the
loyalty of the fighting forces to which it owed its rise to constitutional
office, and the concomitant need to kill off, buy off or otherwise co-opt
anyone capable of mobjlizing an opposing force. The significance of this
fact .goes well beyond a simple computation of relative troop strength at
the disposition of the contenders. For it was not the capacity or strength
of the state's incumbents vis-a-vis its opponents that mattered as much as
the certain knowledge among the subjects of the state that the state itself
was not the ultimate power holder. In short, real sovereignty was held by
9

·

Robert H. Holden, Armies without Nations: Public Violence and Staie Formation in Cemra/
America, 1821-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch, I, pp. 25-8; idem,
"Constructing the Limits of State Violence in Central America: Towards a New _Research
Agenda," Journal of Latin American Studies, voL 28, no. 2 (May 1996).
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whatever fighting forces had won the last battle or could plausibly
threaten tl1e incumbents. Chronically improvisational, such states could
scarcely expect to apply their legislative dispositions except by violence,
owing to the fact that they were not perceived as .either the legitimate or
even the ultimate source of the power required to enforce compliance. It
was therefore frequently expedient for the nominal subjects of these
nominal governments to bargain independently with various fighting
entities instead of with .the government itself. 10
Over time, · the symptoms of improvisationalism changed. Outright
warfare among rival caudillos for control of the state had faded in most
of Latin America by the late nineteenth century, though in some places
such as Central America it continued well into .the twentieth century.
Rival party militias under the command of their respective caudillos
contested the Costa Rican civil war of 1948, obeying a pattern that also
graced the politics of Honduras and Bolivia, among others, into the
1950s. What persisted almost everywhere, with a diversity of manifestations, were the particularisms of a patrimonial political culture in which
expressions of power remained tied, not to institutions of state, but to
individual strongmen or their organizations.
A second feature of the "plausible ontology" that Tilly called for
follows from the first. Recall that taxation/extraction (Tilly applies the
terms interchangeably) was one of the three corners of Tilly's triangular model of interactive state making (the other two being war making
and capital accumulation). 11 But in most of Latin America we have
not often seen "states" engaged in an unqualified way in the collection
of revenue for state-building purposes. For the most part, state makers
have been predatory rent seekers dependent on clientelistic networks
to distribute plunder and dispense violence. The last attribute has
probably lost some of its validity over the last two or three decades,
but it is by no means irrelevant even today; in fact, it is a fair description of political life in Guatemala in 2010, where huge personal fortunes stand to be made by state agents who avoid taxation/extraction
and who subvert the state's responsibility for maintaining order. 12
10

11

12

Holden, Armies without Nations, pp. 25-6.
Tilly, Big Stru ctures, p. 141; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,"
in: Peter B.. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds. ), Bringing the State
Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-91, here at p. 172.
For many people in Latin America, especially in countries such as Guatemala, El
Salvador, and parts of Mexico and Brazil, power over their lives has been routinely
exercised for generations by shadowy, composite "governments" of politicians,
gangsters, · soldiers and wealthy entrepreneurs who pact, divide, compete, make war
and realign under conditions of total unaccountability . For Guatemala, Ivan Briscoe
magisterially synthesized the evidence in "A Criminal Bargain: The State and Security in
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Grzymala-Busse pointed out the importance of distinguishing between
the capture of resources by the state (Tilly's idea) and the capture of
resources by state agents. She observed that because predatory regimes
"deliberately weaken state institutions," they have the weakest states
and they tend to be more personalistic. 13 Predation and personalism
remain well-known features of the patrimonial values underlying Latin
American state formation, and highly congruent with the region's
equally notorious inconsistency in applying the rule of law.
Finally, the continuity of state incompetence ("fragility" appears to be
the favored euphemism at the moment), including the violence that has
always seemed to accompany the patrimonial political culture of the
region, has to be recognized. A 2007 UN report on the five states of
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua) described them as places where "violence appears to be
endemic" and the rule of law practically nonexistent. Levels of general
violence, homicide rates and kidnapping for ransom were among the
highest in the world, having actually risen since the regional wars ended
there in the early 1990s. State agents, including those charged with
maintaining lawful order, routinely collaborate with the non-state perpetrators of criminal violence. 14 In Brazil, an investigator observed in
2000, "The first and most basic issue in the next decade for government
and civil society is to cope with lawless violence." The systematic violation of rights has been "a trademark of Brazilian political history" atleast
since the end of the empire, in 1889. 15 In Rio de Janeiro, dealers in illegal
drugs since at least 2000 have become a "new type of political actor" by
building "mediated links into the state not just to obtain resources but
also to gain access to the state power that facilitates their ongoing criminal activities." 16 During Argentina's December 2001 wave of looting
and vandalism, police and other state agents maintained their reputation

13

14

15
16

Guatemala," working paper no. 88 (Madrid: Fundaci6n para · las Relaciones
Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2009) www.fride.org/publication/658/the-stateand-security-in-guatemala.
Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State
Formation," Comparative Political Studies, vol. 41, no. 4/5 (April/May 2008), pp. 638-73,
here atp. 639.
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Crime and Development in Central America:
Caught in the Crossfire (New York: United Nations, May 2007), p. 17, passim; Briscoe,
"A Criminal Bargain," pp. 10-11.
Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, "Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of Law,"
Daedalus, vol. 129, no. 2 (2000), pp. 119-43, here at p. 139.
Enrique Desmond Arias, "The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social
Order in Rio De Janeiro," Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (May 2006),
pp. 293-325, here at p. 298.

250

Robert H. Holden

for lawless violence by collaborating with the looters. 17 In Mexico in
2009 alone, the police and the army confronted each other more than 65
times, guns drawn and sometimes exchanging gunfire, as the army
sought to collar drug smugglers within the ranks of the police, even
though high-ranking army officers (along with officials of the federal
prosecutor's office) themselves were also found working with drug smugglers.18 Latin America's 140,000-plus homicide deaths per year are twice
the world's average, making it the most violent region in the world after
Sub-Saharan Africa. 19 Democracy remains a distant prospect. "Power
has not been dispersed; corruption persists or has worsened; and politics
continues to be characterized by personalistic exchange relationships,
lack of accountability, wide executive discretion, and absence of the rule
oflaw." 20
Looking back on the three features of the Latin American state just
proposed, it seems clear that quite a few countries qualify as places where
the prevailing ethos is "parapolitical," recently defined by a group of
scholars as situations in which criminals act like sovereigns, and sovereigns act like criminals in a systematic but clandestine way. Individuals
associated with the state - especially those responsible for security and
intelligence operations - work closely with criminal elements to subvert
formal constitutional procedures, while relying on contraband trade and
acting autonomously within the political system for criminal purposes. 21
In Latin America, this is hardly a new phenomenon; what I have called
elsewhere the "parainstitutional" agents of public violence have been
(I tried to show) deeply rooted features of Latin America's state formation process. 22

17

18

19

20

21

22

Javier Auyero, "The Political Makings of the 2001 Loo tings in Argentina," Journal ·of
Latin American Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (May 2006), pp. 241-65; Laura Kalmanowiecki,
"Origins an.d Applications of Political Policing in · Argentina," Lalin American
Perspectives,vol. 27, no. 2 (March 2000), pp. 36-56 .
Julie Watson and Olga R. Rodriguez, "In Northern Mexican [sic], Soldiers Increasingly
Suspicious of Often Corrupt Police in Drug War," Associated Press, Nov~mber 9, 2009;
Marc Lacey, "In Mexico, Sorting Out Good Guys From Bad," New York Times,
November 2, 2008.
Alessandra Heinemann and Dorce Verner, Crime and Violence in Development:
A Literature Review of Lalin America and the Caribbean (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper no . 4041, 2008), pts. l, 2, 5.
Judith Teichman, "Merging the Modem and the Traditional: Market Reform in Chile
and Argentina," Comparative Politics, vol. 37, no . 1 (October 2004), pp. 23-40, here at
p. 23.
Robert Cribb, "Introduction:
Parapolitics, Shadow Governance and Criminal
Sovereignty," in: Eric Wilson (ed.), Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and
Criminal Sovereignty (London; New York: Pluto Press, 2009), p. 8.
Holden, Armies without Nations, pp. 14- 15 and throughout.
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What Can War Explain about Latin American
State Making?
Turning to Tilly's second task, that of specifying the relevant "fields of
variation," I would like to begin by weighing the variable in state formation that Tilly made famous -war. As European states engaged in wars to
defeat internal rivals and to repulse or devour external ones, they gradually ·monopolized· war making, a process that required huge outlays of
resources and thus forced the states, in varying degrees, to bargain with
their subjects or soon-to-be citizens, Tilly wrote. Over time, in return for
more and more rights, including those of consent and representation,
plus the imposition of certain limits on the state's authority over them,
citizens gradually paid more taxes, allowed themselves to be drafted into
fighting nationalistic and patriotic wars and accepted the central authority's abridgement of local rule. "Capital-intensive" and "coercion-intensive" states followed distinctive paths in this process of negotiation, but
everywhere, "bargaining over the state's extractive claims produced
rights, privileges, and protective institutions that had not previously
existed. " 23 Considering the centrality of that argument to the theme of
this collection, I think it is worth recalling the modesty, even selfdisparagement that accompanied Tilly's presentation of his "war makes
states" proposition and its many derivatives and elaborations. "The
argument brings with it few illustrations and no evidence worthy of the
name," .he wrote; and again, the argument is "very, very crudely" stated
and "may well be wrong. I certainly provided no evidence here for its
correctness." 24 Others have questioned the validity of Tilly's model even
for Europe itself. 25
For the Latin American case, let us begin with Miguel Centeno's
splendid study of the relationship between war making and state making,
an explicit attempt to test Tilly's proposition that war makes states. In
Latin -America generally, Centeno observed, "state power has always
been shallow and contested" in contrast to Asian and European states.
Why? Hypothesizing, with Tilly, that a history of big international wars
makes states rich and powerful and even ties them more firmly to the
majority of its _inhabitants, Centeno argued that just because Latin
23
24
25

Tilly, Coercian, pp. 9-10, 68-9, 94, 100---4.Also see idem, Big Structures, pp. 9- 10.
Tilly, "War Making and State Making," p . 170; idem, Big Siructures, pp. 142, 143.
Graeme Gill's finely honed summary of the evidence against Tilly concludes that while
war may have stimulated the growth of state bureaucracies and their ·tax-collection
capacities, factors other than war -were at least as important, and sometimes war
mattered very little; The Nature and Development of the Modern State (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 154-8 .
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American states so rarely engaged in big international wars, they have
remained comparatively weak, underdeveloped and incompetent : "The
geopolitical tendency toward peace and the underdevelopment
of
the state are closely linked." But why didn't the Latin American state
fight big international wars? "Because it did not form sophisticated
political institutions capable of managing wars. No states, no wars."
Thus, on this view, it takes competent states to make big war. But it also
takes big wars to make . competent states, for international peace
''deprived the [Latin American) states ofa potentially important impetus
for development." The argument is explicitly circular, for it states that
the reason states did ·not go to war was because they were too weak and
disorganized to do so. And the reason that they stayed weak is because
they did not go to war. Besides making them unfit to fight big wars, the
incompetence of these states had another consequence: it made them
incapable of preventing internal conflict, and as a result, civil war and
political violence became almost routine. 2 6 Evidently, then, the appropriate question is, "Why were the Latin American states weak and
incompetent to begin ·with?" for this is ·the condition that explains why
they supposedly avoided big wars in the first place, and presumably why
they continued to avoid big wars while confronting serious political
violence within their own borders . Centeno acknowledged as much, a
point I will return to in due course.
While Centeno excluded the Central American countries from his
analysis of Latin America, he nevertheless observed that they represented
unspecified "important exceptions" to his arguments .2 7 Now I would
like to undertake my own test of Tilly's proposition by focusing on the
Central American states, emphasizing three points. First, as I have
argued elsewhere, "war" needs to be broadened into "public violence"
in order to capture more accurately the reality of this aspect of state
formation. The modern association of "war" with organized (and overwhelming) violence between nation-states with clearly defined borders
would limit and even distort the reality of violent conflict on the isthmus
over the last two centuries. Of course "wars" in the .plain sense of the
26

27

Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debi: War and ihe Nation-Srate in Latin America
(Un iversity Park : Penn State University Press , 2002 ), pp . 20-6 , 265- 9, 271. Both
Centeno's characterization of Latin America as a region that has avoided large-scale
international war since independence, and his explanation, were challenged by Jorge
I. Dominguez, who argued that the Latin American "peace" only began in
the late .ninete enth century, and was owing to internati onal factors including the
maintenance ·of a South American balance of power . Jorge I. Domingue z, Boundary
Dispuces in Latin America (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003),
p. 20 , passim .
Centeno, Blood and Debr, 1, n. l.
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word did take place but they can best be understood within the larger
perspective conveyed by "public violence" ~ the killing, maiming and
destruction that take place within the field of state power, engaging not
only agents of the state· but their collaborators and rivals - including
criminal gangs, death squads, party militias, vigilantes and twentiethcentury guerrilla "armies of national liberation. " 28 Second, in comparison to the rest ofLatin America, the isthmus has probably endured more
public violence than any other country or area of the region. 29 Third, few
episodes of public violence in Central America have ·been devoid of
strong international dimensions, often including the direct participation
of forces of various kinds from neighboring isthmian countries (as well as
the United States from time to time), so that almost all strife even when
contained within the borders of a single country can usually be considered international in scope. As a result, it cannot be said that Central
America has been lacking in international violent conflict.
In short, the Central American countries have sustained nearly two
centuries of intense state-associated violence - almost all of it with strong
international aspects - and yet can still claim to have some of the most
feeble and incompetent states in all of Latin America. Even the Cold
War period's fusion of internal and external threats associated with
communism did little to enhance state capacity, for the build-ups that
occurred were almost entirely confined to military and other securityrelated functions, rather than, say, any significant gain in "extractive"
capacity or in levels of accountability to a newly empowered citizenry.
Moreover, they were paid for by a resource-rich ally, the United States.
When the threat of communism faded in the late .1980s, and the military
more or less submitted itself to civilian rule, the state as a whole
remained weak and ineffective. Whatever gains to state effectiveness
may have been owing to international conflict elsewhere, it sapped state
effectiveness in Central America, further impoverishing their inhabitants
while whittling away at what little legitimacy might be attributed to the
state. In Central America, we see inept states bufno lack of internationally oriented conflict. State incompetence cannot therefore be explained
by the absence of international conflict in Central America - a place that,
as Lindo-Fuentes put it, war had already become a "way of life" within
the first two decades of independence. 30

28
29
30

For more on "public violence" as a concept see Holden, Armies without Nations,
pp. 9-24.
Holden, Armies without Nations, pp. 28-9.
Hector Lindo-Fuentes, Weak Foundations: The Economy of El Salvador in the Nineteenth
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 48.
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Costa Rica is the one exceptional Central American state - for
its comparative capacity, stability, legitimacy and achievements in
extending the benefits of social democracy. These are characteristics
that even set it apart from most other countries in Latin America. Like
its isthmian neighbors, Costa Rica's public violence has invariably been
strongly international in character, involving alliances as well as strife
with the fighting forces of other states. On the other hand, by the 1920s,
Costa .Rica had allowed its armed forces to shrink to the point that the
national military establishment could be abolished after the 1948 civil
war with scarcely a word of dissent, and replaced with a national
gendarmerie. Tilly's dictum would suggest "no military, so no war, and
therefore no state." But this is exactly the opposite of Costa Rica's
experience. Having abolished its national military establishment, Costa
Rica became a comparatively successful state, so that success could no
more be said to be the result of international conflict and militarization
than could the failure of the other four countries of Central America:3 1
Costa Rica is a successful state, and the others are failures or nearfailures. Yet all have regularly had to confront internationalized violence, though Costa Rica for most of the last century has carried on
without a regular military establishment.
In Central America, as in much of the rest of Latin America, war and
the threat of war cannot therefore be said to have exercised a strongly
independent influence .on the course of state formation except to further
debilitate already-decrepit states. They were born weak, unstable, coercive, quasi-legitimate and incompetent, and - with the few exceptions
already noted - they stayed that way. The Tillyesque idea that a certain
relationship between "war" and "the state" exerted an independent effect
on the formation of the state should be discarded, for Latin America at
large and the Central American region in particular.

When Is a State or Government

"Legitimate"?

In the conclusion of his book, Centeno left a provocative clue to a very
different explanation for state feebleness in Central America and elsewhere in Latin America. He observed that war can only contribute to
state making among states that are reasonably well organized to begin
with. Europe enjoyed these preconditions for successful state making and thus war making - but Latin America did not. As a result, Latin
31
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Beyond Mere War

255

American countries were not prepared to fight big wars, so they didn't.
War, Centeno concluded, was little more than an "accelerating mechanism for a process that had its origins somewhere else [emphasis added]."
But just where is that "somewhere else"? For the deep causes of diverse
state-formation processes, the place to go, Centeno asserted, is "the very
problem of political authority and order," for states. probably cannot
come into being "where no authority has previously existed." Centeno
divided "authority and order" into two components, both of which Latin
America lacked: "organization" and a socio-cultural congruence between
states and the communities they sought to dominate. 32 Ending up by
rejecting the Tilly dictum as inapplicable in Latin America, Centeno
therefore suggested but did not develop .an alternative hypothesis for
state incompetence.
The rest of this essay takes over where Centeno left off, by proposing to
analyze authority as an alternative "field of variation" that could be
helpful in understanding diverse state-formation outcomes. However,
in a flagrant departure from the conventional use of the term "authority,"
I refer, not to the one who holds power (potestas) but rather to the
authoritative source (auctoritas) of a norm or moral principle, in this case
norms or principles that can be applied to test the legitimacy of a regime
or government. My main guide here is the work of the late Alvaro D'Ors,
the Spanish jurist for whom the key to understanding human organization of any kind could be found in the fundamental character of the
distinction between potestas and auctoritas. Legitimacy (legitimus) derives
from law (lex), implying that power exercised under the law is legitimate
power. "Law" in this context implies more than mere "legality" (i.e.,
positive law enunciated by some social collectivity) but a more permanent law, one that does not depend on a social contract but on principles
of natural or divine law, as well as the rational requirements of scientific
knowledge. Such is the "authority" that confers legitimacy. Yet this
authority cannot be effective unless it is socially recognized, perhaps by
way of state-established courts of justice, the voice of a widely respected
individual, certain institutions independent of the state, or religious
authorities. Hence I refer to "legitimating authority" (i.e., an authority
according to which legitimacy is rightfully weighed) rather than to
the more conventional "legitimate authority" (i.e., a power holder considered to be legitimate).
32
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So, on D'Ors' view, the role of authority is never to exercise power but
to speak to power. Authority is always counterposed to power. The role
of power is to seek the approval of authority but never to claim it for itself,
for to do so would be to exceed its natural limits. And like authority,
power too must be "socially recognized," though the most influential
factor in the social recognition of power will be whether or not it has
received the assent of authority. D'Ors encapsulated his argument about
the distinction between authority and power in two now-famous aphorisms: La autoridad es el saber socialmente reconocido y la postestad es, precisamente, el poder socialmente reconocido ("Authority is socially recognized
knowledge, and power is precisely socially recognized power"). From
which it follows, Pregunta quien puede y responde quien sabe ("He who
can, asks; he who knows, answers"}. Only those with the sociallyrecognized power to do so can question authority; only those with
socially recognized authority can reply. Hence, authority can never execute or block acts that belong to power; it can only endorse or condemn
them. Of course, whether power actually enjoys the assent of authority
may be uncertain, as can the degree of power's social recognition. In any
case, the modifier "legitimate" cannot logically be applied to authority;
authority is authority, and it never depends on power. Only power can be
legitimate or illegitimate. 33
If the norm is power's strict separation from authority, the tragic
drama of our age, according to D'Ors, has been the state's ascription of
authority to itself, a move that entailed replacing legitimacy with mere
legality. The state, as the source of positive law, in •effect claims to
legitimate itself, as did the agents of the state established by the French
Revolution. As the nineteenth century wore on, liberal democratic
regimes dropped all references to legitimacy except as pure constitutional
legality. The trend culminated in Hans Kelsen's famous justification of
political power as purely a matter oflaw, which alone bestows legitimacy.
As a result, ·modern democracies struggle to make a coherent appeal to
legitimacy. For example, a particular government is said to be "illegitimate" when it lacks popular support and can only govern \;)y force. But
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what proportion of the population does it take to make a government
illegitimate? German and Italian totalitarian regimes were at one time
massively popular; a majority of Germans and Italians never came close
to resisting them. But none of us today would qualify either regime as
legitimate. The only alternative, it would seem, is to seek legitimacy in
the authority of the natural law tradition or in divine law. Indeed, D'Ors
asserted, the notion of legitimacy as something greater than law has
persisted, and with it the lingering assumption that only a power that
complies with that "something" merits obedience. 34
· A more immediate ·consideration, for the purposes of this essay, is to
notice how the failure to properly distinguish authority, legitimacy and
power has emptied "legitimacy" of any substantive meaning, even
though we cannot seem to let the concept go. In the mid-1970s, "legitimacy" was already "pretty unfashionable" among scholars, wrote Peter
H . Smith at the time. He argued that "the cultural determinants of
politics" (by which he meant legitimacy) were being overlooked by
investigators who erroneously assumed that Latin America must be
evolving toward democracy. 35 By then, scholars of the Latin American
state were already displaying a nearly exclusive interest in power and its
distribution, in the belief that power alone authorizes and legitimates, or
that legitimacy, if it exists at all, is too hard to define and impossible to
measure, or that legitimacy discourses are nothing but the cunning
dissimulations of power holders. 36 Richard Morse stood practically alone
among prominent historians of Latin America in conceiving the core
34
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problem of the region's political history to have been the search for the
legitimization of power. 37 Occasionally, the fog dissipated enough to
suggest once again that something about legitimacy seemed important
even if we could not quite put our finger on it. A contemporary example
is the UNDP's above-cited 2004 study, "Democracy in Latin America,"
whose authors argued that Latin Americans had to solve their governability crisis by trying to "build a new legitimacy for the State." The study
went on to mention "legitimacy" 22 times over the course of its 288 pages
but without once either probing its meaning or discussing the conditions
that might give rise to the construction of a "new legitimacy." 38
About midway between Smith .'s vain attempt to revive the study of
legitimacy and the UNDP project, the Brazilian Francisco C. Weffort
observed that the entire half-century sj.nce the 1930s had constituted "a
crisis of legitimacy" in Latin America. In a. poignant and evidently
personal reminiscence, W effort wrote that one had to have lived .through
that crisis in order to · know precisely just how truly it was a crisis of
legitimacy, to have shared the general intuition that some fundamental
deficiency was ravaging the state, or society, or both at once. "Throughout that period it was (and remains) a characteristic feature of the Latin
American mind to know that things were (and indeed remain) 'mistaken,' whatever the place and whatever the reasons for the 'mistake'."
W effort identified the effects of the "mistake" in terms much like the
characteristics I earlier associated with the "improvisational state": to
Weffort, it was "a chronic instability apparent in the continual threats
of coups d'etat and in political phenomena such as populism and military
interventions. " 39
In Weffort's account, "legitimacy" seems to be what that state would
have acquired had some fundamental, yet unnamed and rather mysterious defect or "mistake" been corrected. "Something" was out of place,
or missing entirely, or its nature perverted. The result was Weffort's
"chronic instability," or my "crisis of order and legitimacy,'' or
O'Donnell's "severe incompleteness of the state."
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That "something," that curious omission or deficiency, I propose, is
precisely a way of gauging legitimacy that descends from a sociallyrecognized
principle of authority, or even from some divergent methods and principles
of authority that nevertheless overlap in a complementary way, defusing the
potential for conflict among them. When understood as a quality that
depends on authority, the concept oflegitimacy can be cured of its vaguely
intuitive status and acquire the analytical strength it is supposed to possess.
To affirm or contest the legitimacy of a given regime or administration is to
deploy some norm or cluster of norms dictated by a particular authority. To
understand the source of consensus or conflict driven by rival claims of
legitimacy, it is not enough to know that one band contests the legitimacy
or "right to rule" of a regime, and another one defends it. We need to go
further, and try to identify the nature of the authority that each band has
chosen as the source of the norms or principles that guides its judgment of
the regime's legitimacy. In weighing the legitimacy of a regime, in other
words, we find that people believe in one authority or another, and it is
precisely the failure to find a way of harmonizing that diversity of beliefs in
one or another authority that accounts, in large part, for Latin America's
interminable "crisis of legitimacy." To repeat: Authority, on this view,
cannot itself be either legitimate or illegitimate, nor can it ever exercise
power itself. What authority does require is social recognition, and it is
precisely the absence of a more or less unitary, socially recognized principle
of authority that distinguishes the Latin American state formation process.
To frame the prol.Jlem in these terms is to opt for a mode of explanation
that grants priority (as Smith sought to do) to the realm of culture in state
formation, over against the prevailing preferences for materialist, institutionalist, rational-choice and power-based modes. None of the latter, as
Rae argued, can excavate the deep sources of state formation. To understand just why people choose the "interests" that dominate such explanations requires an investigation of the moral content of their choices. 40 In a
similar vein, Lehman identified culture as the primary site for the study of
"political legitimations," which he argued (following Berger and
Luckmann) are always constituted by values (rules of the game) that in
turn require the enunciation of some core moral principles. Partisans and
powerholders alike apply moral imperatives - the first, to accuse or acclaim
the powerholders; the second, to justify their own power.4 1

40

41

Heather Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples (Cambridge University
Press, 2002), pp. 24-44, 304-305. The primary field of variation in this study was the
definition of insider-outsider boundaries for determining the membership of a polity.
Edward W. Lehnian, The Viable Polity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992),
pp. 141-2.

260

Robert H. Holden

And so we ask, which authority principles were at play in a given
society, at a given time? How were they deployed to test the legitimacy
of a particular political program, regime or government? How did contention over the rightful sources or principles . of authority shape the four
most obvious and persistent symptoms of state incompetence: corruption on an Olympian scale, intolerably high levels of public violence and
disorder, widespread indifference to the rule of ·faw and political
instability?

The Search for Authority in Latin American State Making
If an enfeeblement of traditional understandings of authority swept the
West, as D'Ors averred, the cultural ~d political codes available to their
assailants, their defenders and other actors varied immensely as between,
say, Britain and the United States, on the ,one hand, and New Spain or
Spain itself. In this way, following Eisenstadt, the same general movement could yield distinctive outcomes in particular places. If authority
was somehow reconstructed or refounded in a non-traditional guise in
the first group of countries; in much of Latin America the process of
reconstructing authority that should have begun after 1808 remains
unfinished. In showing how this might have happened, I would· like. to
outline the ways in which political authority had been understood before
the crisis of 1808, how it had already been challenged well before 1808 by
the monarchy itself, and how these conflicting interpretations were then
seized on, further reinterpreted and applied in competitive ways in the
post-independence republican context.
Basically, the peoples of the new republics divided over three different
conceptions oflegitimating authority. The first was the traditional, medieval belief ("translation" theory) that authority originates naturally or by
divine ordination in the body politic, which freely decides to endow the
power to govern upon whomever it regards as the most qualified person
or group. The ruler thus holds power by a free act of the people, who can
in turn take away that power if it is misused, and transfer it to some more
qualified ruler. In translation theory, the consent of the political community is the defining act. Monarchs with absolutist pretensions gradually
defined a deviant "designation theory" under which the body politic acts,
not freely, but under Providential direction, to designate the ruler whose
distinction as a leader is so evident that he must have been divinely
chosen for leadership. Here, the political community is duty-bound to
make an irrevocable designation. The third approach was the protodemocratic ideology ("liberalism") of the Age of Revolution, into which
the Hispanic republics were born. Liberal ideology dearly owed a good
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deal to translation theory, but it also challenged that theory by rejecting
the divine-law basis of authority by absolutizing the will of the majority
(Rousseau) or the state (Hobbes), and its disregard of the traditionally
conceived ends of state power - namely, the protection of the common
good. To the liberals, the state was not defined according to any divinely
ordered natural "end" but by history, which is to say, by purely human
goals and desires. 42
An underlying •clash of "translation," "designation" and "liberal"
conceptions of legitimate political authority not only shaped political
conflict in Latin America but kept it going, fueled in part by the fact that
it followed the destruction of a manifestly incompetent and corrupt
monarchy that had defined its authority in terms of a divine-right
"designation" theory . Liberals drew on aspects of both translation and
designation theories of authority to legitimate their rule. Some conservatives, horrified by the specter of democracy, resorted to the "designation" thesis to defend divine-right monarchy. Liberals eventually did
likewise, but now to defend a quasi-absolutist, authoritarian state
governed by liberal principles eventually corrupted by utilitarianism,
positivism and social Darwinism. Many others -,- perhaps the most
authentically "traditional" elements of society - upheld the "translation" view, along with its distinctive teleology and natural- or divine-law
premises.
Three contemporary historians have grappled with the implications of
these understandings for nineteenth-century politics in Latin America .
0 . Carlos Stoetzer documented a heterodox argument in favor of a
widespread "translationist" understanding of authority in Hispanic
America that, he further claimed, was deployed to justify the rebellion
against the Bourbon monarchy. Stoetzer made much of the clash
between the designationist outlook of the late Bourbons and the translationist premises of the Spanish Americans, but he confined his analysis
strictly to the independence wars . Austen Ivereigh distinguished an
"ecumenical" liberalism (strongly translationist) from a "monistic"
(more designationist, and thus absolutistic) liberalism. lvereigh, unlike
Stoetzer , recognized that pre-independence assumptions about authority remained in play for some decades after independence, but omitted
42
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any speculation about how they might have persisted over the long
term, and limited his analysis to church-state matters. In a series of
works, our third historian, Fran~ois-Xavier Guerra, not only tracked
(like Stoetzer) the impact of distinctive beliefs about authority from the
late Bourbon period through the independence wars but went on to
document their presence well into the nineteenth century. Guerra also
proposed that the conflicts over the nature of the appropriate legitimating authority that animated the independence movement and the politics of the nineteenth century persisted throughout the twentieth century
as well. A liberal view of the nation as a voluntary association of equal
individuals (among whom sovereignty collectively resided) never ceased
to clash with a more traditional understanding of authority that ·descended from translation theory, in which sovereignty rested in a mosaic
of concrete social and geographical corporate entities rather than.individual persons. On the second view, legitimacy is conveyed by means of
pacts and the enunciation of special privileges, rights and duties associated with the group. Pactismo, or the habit of governing through special
arrangements with distinctive groups, in effect lived on to disrupt the
liberal project. 43
One result was the consolidation of personalistic and patrimonial
institutions. In the absence of a consensus on the source of authority,
the right to rule was increasingly evaluated in highly personalistic terms.
Hence caudillismo, patrimonialism, patron-clientage ~ animated and
reshaped after independence under the influence of modernity. Today
they remain symptomatic expressions ofthe absence of a socially recognized moral authority capable of providing the criteria necessary for
weighing legitimacy. Thus, the tendency toward crisis, violent disorder
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and indifference to the rule of law. The authority-'centered nature of the
crisis also clarifies one of the most glaring features of Latin American
political conflict: the ubiquity and persistence of a . discourse that
demonizes and violently condemns the political enemy while associating him with imminent catastrophe. Precisely because the underlying
disagreement concerned the appropriate source of moral authority,
there was no place for a political enemy but in jail, exile or a coffin. If
mere interests were at . stake, a rational choice would have dictated
compromise . But ma moral battle, especially one over the identity of
authority competent to judge legitimacy, compromise is rarely an
option:
Disagreements over basic beliefs about the source of the authority
capable of endowing legitimacy seeded and sustained a long-term crisis
of legitimacy in Latin America . The range and diversity of such beliefs,
as well as their contradictory character and thus their potential for
conflict, exceeded the limits of the threefold taxonomy of authority that
prevailed in the early decades of independence. Their range and diversity cannot be adequately documented within the scope of a single
essay. A few examples will have to suffice to illustrate the endurance
and ubiquity of, first, a crisis of legitimacy; second, allusions (usually
indirectly or implicitly, and perhaps not even consciously) to diverse
authorities in order to justify contradictory legitimacy norms; and third,
the demonization and violent condemnation of an enemy associated
with imminent catastrophe. All three characteristics are eventually synthesized in a rhetoric of "national salvation" - a phrase that turns up
repeatedly in the political history of Latin America.
Such discourses were frequently directed against members of an
opposing faction of the same party or political band. The Mexican
Gen. Porfirio Diaz' "Plan de la Noria" (November 1871) can be taken
as a convenient example. In justifying his revolt against the just-elected
government of Benito Juarez, a fellow liberal whose administration
Diaz himself had honorably served, Diaz referred to the liberalcontrolled National Congress as ''a chamber of courtesans" and "a
cataclysm of perversion and . immorality"; he accused the Juarez
administration of having forgotten "the laws and practices of Christian
civilization" and of turning the republic into "an immoral and corrupt
farce." Diaz's "Pl .an" concluded: "Let us fight, then, for the cause of
the people and the people will be the sole owner of its triumph." He
pledged "the observance of the constitution" and asserted "that no
citizen should impose himself and perpetuate himself in the exercise
of power, and this will be the last revolution." Of course, Diaz would
go on to violate, more spectacularly than any president in Mexican
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history, the very promises at the heart of his revolt. 44 But note how he
appealed to traditional values and Christian virtues - transcendent
authority - in justifying the overthrow of rulers invariably characterized as "tyrants" - a move specifically authorized by the medieval and
early modern "translation" theorists.
In 1932, another caudillo, Augusto Sandino, appealed to transcendent
authority when he called for Nicaragua's freedom from occupation of the
U.S. Marines - a freedom attainable "only by bullets, and at the cost of
our own blood, we have said, and that nest of political scoundrels who
are · fighting each other to take over the whip of the invader . will be
annihilated by their own guilt in a not too distant future. " 45 The guerrilla
leader's authority for his challenge to the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan
state emerged from a self-concocted synthesis of traditional Christianity,
magic and paganism. Sandino saw himself as the divinely chosen "warring messiah-prophet" of the imminent redemption of the entire planet,
not just .Nicaragua. 46
Three decades later, Sandino's Marxist epigones organized the Frente
Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional to forcefully remove another tyrannical government. Like Sandino, they claimed exclusive leadership of a
redemptive millenarian movement whose quest for a legitimate government originated in their belief in semi-mystical authority. The Sandinistas, as they styled themselves, called their authority "scientific," for it
was "history" that justified their challenge to a regime they regarded as
illegitimate. Professing faith in the "historical character of the proletariat
as the most revolutionary and fundamental class for the maximum
development of our liberation process," they identified themselves as
the historically denominated "vanguard" and thus the sole legitimate
organizer of the proletariat in both its violent conquest of power and its
subsequent administration of power. 47 Unlike Sandino's, their movement triumphed, with the collapse ofthe dictatorship of Anastasio
Somoza Debayle in 1979.
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In his attempt to lead a socialist revolution from the elective office of
the presidency of Chile, Salvador Allende likewise identified his ultimate
authority as "history," and the proletariat as its instrument --,a discovery
he attributed to a synthesis of freemasonry and "the humanism of all ages
and particularly ... Marxist humanism." Just as "history" led first Russia
and then China to blaze the trail toward socialism, in 1970 "once again,
history has permitted a break with the ·past" in Chile. It was to the
authority of history, as revealed by his Marxist-humanist-Masonic
ideology, that Allende appealed in justifying the legitimacy of the regime he
sought to build in the name of the proletariat: "a democratic, national,
revolutionary and popular Government which will open the road to
socialism" and to the creation ofa "new man" in a "classless society." 48
In 1973, the legitimacy of Allende's government would in turn be challenged by the country's armed forces. In removing what they called "an
illegitimate, immoral government" from power, Chile's military leaders
appealed to the constitution and the country 's laws. They acted, they
said, "before God and history," out of a "moral duty" imposed on them
by the majority of the population. Two years later, Gen. ·Augusto .Pinochet, the leader of the coup and now the unelected president of Chile,
elaborated on the contradictory sources of authority at play in the crisis of
1970- 73: "The existence and propagation of Leninism-Marxism in the
world today represents the destruction of the basic moral foundations
from which the Western and Christian civilizations derive . . . . The workl
today faces an unprecedented form of war" between •Christianity and
communism. "I devotedly implore Our Holy Lord," Pinochet concluded, to keep Chile's ~'flame of liberty" from burning out. 4 9
Finally, contemporary Latin American political life forces us to consider yet another kind of belief about the source of legitimating authority that has been seen throughout the post-independence history of the
region. Where an office of state is understood to be what I described
above as an opportunity to distribute plunder and to dispense violence
in order to protect plunder rights, there is no interest ·in achieving
anything "for" the state, for to occupy any given office of state is simply
to possess an instrument for . personal enrichment. The state's grand
purpose is still the abatement of disorder through lawgiving and
48
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Regis Debray, The Chilean Revolucion: Conversations with All ende (New York : Pantheon
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coercion, but only insofar as disorder interferes with the aim of selfenrichment. I call it the "entrepreneurial state." Nothing, therefore,
about this kind of "modern" state can be explained by Tilly's theory of
state expansion, with its neat Weberian assumptions about war making,
taxation,
bargaining
and citizenship.
Still, the contemporary
Guatemalan state, say, is a modern state, and like every other human
artefact, it is the product of ideas :;ibout what it ought to be for, or what
makes it "legitimate," a status that in turn seeks justification in the
name of some kind of authority. To those who have accommodated
themselves to the entrepreneurial state, a legitimate state is one that
affords office holders and their dependents the freedom to function as
entrepreneurs. 50 The "authorizing" principle of this concept of legitimacy might be moral nihilism, in which values themselves are thought to
be arbitrary and justice is therefore a· fiction. This principle competes
with, but frequently defeats, more traditiopal, justice-oriented theories
of legitimacy put forward in countries such as Guatemala by some
political parties, non-governmental organizations, social movements,
and religious authorities as well as individuals whose notion of citizenship presumes a different sort of authority principle (perhaps one of
those mentioned above) and thus a different standard of legitimacy.
In Latin America, a dynamic diversity of rival moral authorities, and
hence a diversity of legitimacies, established the .basic conditions for
the rise of weak and inefficient states, endless violence and indifference to the rule of law. I identified three main alternative authorities
(those linked to liberalism and to translation and designation theory)
that first emerged during the period of the independence movements,
but it is the very inventiveness of the ongoing search for authorities (as
the examples just given reveal) that merits attention at the moment.
New or reformed state institutions can achieve little in the absence of a
socially-recognized authority - one derived from an axiology conceived
variously as secular or supernatural, a composite of the two, or as
stemming from the natural law tradition - that is capable of bestowing
legitimacy on a state, regime or government. Without such recognition, state institutions are in no · position to derive any long-term
strength from warfare in any of its guises. War is a feature of Latin
American political life that accelerated, not the formation of successful
states, as Tilly argued for Europe, but rather state deformation and
failure. The fatal impairment of the Tilly thesis is its reification of the
state and the corollary of a behavioristic determinism ("wars make
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states") entailed by reification. This essay has documented the sterility
of that approach in the Latin American context. Collective entities like
states are constituted by individual persons and apart from the acts of
persons, they have no independent reality. 51 This is the principle
I have tried to deploy in showing how personal commitments to a
diversity of comprehensive beliefs about the sources of moral authority
can explain state instability and incompetence more satisfactorily than
the Tilly thesis.
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